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I. Introduction and Context 
Children of imprisoned parents are being recognised increasingly as rights-bearers, at least in 
academic and practitioner research publications. This builds on the substantial existing 
jurisprudential framework of prisoners’ rights and children’s rights which exists in many 
countries and which has evolved to include and reflect international treaties and conventions 
and also domestic legal principles. The children of prisoners may possess human rights 
emanating from international treaty obligations, combined with specific rights as children 
and, depending on the nature of the offence, as victims. Such rights may be granted explicitly 
via constitutional provisions, or statutes, or may be introduced and maintained by means of 
case law and innovative judicial interpretation of existing international and domestic legal 
obligations. An emergent body of published research literature has explored the nature, 
scope, applicability and operation of such rights in relation to specific categories of prisoners’ 
children including babies, children residing in prisons with their parents, and children 
separated from parents due to their incarceration.  That said, rights discourse itself has been 
criticised in this context and some commentators argue for a conception of duties and 
responsibilities towards children rather than children’s rights. There is, in addition, a real gap 
between theoretical and aspirational rights for children, as emanating from international and 
domestic legal provisions and obligations, and practical and enforceable children’s rights. 
This chapter outlines key sources of rights for children of incarcerated parents, including 
international treaty obligations, state constitutional principles and domestic legislation, and 
then explores two key issues which illustrate the opportunities and challenges for legislators, 
policy-makers and the judiciary posed by a commitment to recognising and implementing 
children’s rights i.e. first, children’s rights when a court is considering imposing a custodial 
sentence on a parent, and, second,  the specific issues raised when considering whether a 
child should reside with a parent in a custodial setting. In particular, the chapter will consider 
the significance of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child. The African Charter is particularly significant as, along with the South 
African Constitution, it has influenced the South African Constitutional Court in prioritising 
children’s rights at the point of the decision whether or not to impose a custodial sentence 
on their primary caregiver. It is thus valuable in illustrating how the rights of children of 
convicted offenders can be prioritised, protected and promoted. The chapter concludes with 
a discussion of good practice in promoting and protecting the rights of children with 
incarcerated parents, questioning the limitations of rights-based approaches in themselves. 
 
II. Sources of Rights for Children of Incarcerated Parents 
 
1. International Obligations  
 
Identifying the rights of prisoners’ children is, on the whole, no easy task. Prisoners’ children 
are not recognised generally as a specific group, but may be served by rights under other legal 
provisions which, for example relate to prison rules, rules for imprisoned women and 
mothers, and general human rights provisions. In some jurisdictions, such as South Africa, 
constitutional provisions relating to the wellbeing of all children can provide valuable 
safeguards for the rights of children whose parents are incarcerated. In other countries, the 
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) 1989 have 
been incorporated into domestic legislation, along with accessible enforcement mechanisms. 
In European countries which are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) 1950, provisions such as Article 8 can offer fertile ground for legal challenges based 
around the qualified right to family life, which applies to both adults and children. However, 
identifying the actual rights prisoners’ children possess can be difficult, and there is also the 
thorny question of whether these rights can be maintained  in practical terms, especially as 
children are vulnerable and may often not have the ability or facilities to access legal services 
to challenge and fight for these rights. 
 
 
The Role of the UN 
At the international level, several bodies of the United Nations have stressed the need to 
address the needs of the children of prisoners, taking into account their human rights, as in 
the Salvador Declaration of the 12th UN Crime Congress (Salvador Declaration on 
Comprehensive Strategies for Global Challenges: Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
Systems and their Development in a Changing World 2010).  In addition, the Bangkok Rules, 
supplementing the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, while focusing 
on women, contain rules requiring consideration of the best interests of the child. This is also 
recognised in the UN Model Strategies and Practical Measures on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women in the Field of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (2014), which extends 
the protections outlined in the model strategies to include the children of incarcerated 
parents, who are recognised as falling within the definition of “children in contact with the 
justice system”. 
 
The most significant international obligations that focus on children are those under the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC). This convention does 
not make specific reference to children affected by parental imprisonment, but it is holistic in 
its approach which means that it contains protections for prisoners’ children which have been 
described as “ample” (Donson & Parkes, 2016). Significantly, however, the US is not a 
signatory to the convention although all other UN member countries are. The Convention has 
four guiding principles which must be read alongside each of the other provisions. Thus the 
key principles are non-discrimination (Article 2); the best interests of the child (Article 3); the 
right of the child to life, survival and development (Article 6) and the right of the child to 
express their views (Article 12). Article 12 sets out that once a child is capable of forming 
views, the child has a right to express those views on all matters affecting him or her, with 
due weight being accorded to those views in accordance with the age and maturity of the 
child. Article 3 provides that in all matters concerning children undertaken by courts of law 
“the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.” 
There are also specific provisions which are relevant to the children of prisoners, including 
Articles 9(1) and 9(3) which set out that children should not be separated from their parents 
except where it is necessary to ensure their best interests are protected, and where they are 
separated then it is vital that they maintain direct and personal contact with both parents on 
a regular basis. Articles 13 and 17 protect children’s rights to information. Subsequent to the 
Convention itself, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has set out that these 
best interests assessments should be incorporated into multiple aspects of the criminal justice 
process as experienced by prisoners’ children, including arrest and detention; sentencing; the 
decision as to whether a child should live in the prison with their caregiver, nd decisions about 
removing State support from the child or the carer (Townhead 2015). NGOs have made, and 
continue to make, highly significant contributions to UN policy-making: one of the most visible 
being the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO) which, through publications and direct 
contributions to UN policy-making, has led the way in identifying and publicising global 
perspectives on  a range of issues relating to the children of incarcerated parents, including 
issues arising parents are arrested when children are present; the bail/remand decision; the 
sentencing stage (including the death penalty), and then questions of the environment/prison 
in which the sentence is served, including visitation rights, provision for parent-child contact, 
then planning for release and subsequent resettlement (Robertson: 2007: Townhead 2015: 
Alejos 2005: Robertson, 2012).i  
The CRC has signalled its commitment to promoting and maintaining the wellbeing of 
prisoners children, holding a Day of General Discussion on 30 September 2011. This has 
prompted the development and publication of guidelines on diverse aspects of the impacts 
of criminal justice processes on children, such as relating to parental arrest and detention; 
mothers/babies and children incarcerated with their parents, and further exploration of 
relevant issues (UNCRC, 2011) . Following on from the Day of General Discussion in 2011, the 
CRC has continued to demonstrate an interest and commitment to the rights of children 
affected by parental imprisonment in its concluding observations. However, as Fortin (2014) 
points out, the UNCRC has always had two major weaknesses. First, many of the rights 
enshrined within it are only aspirational and second, the absence of any direct method of 
formal enforcement. There has, for example, never been a court attached to the UNCRC 
which could assess claims of infringements of convention provisions. The Third Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child came into force on 14 April 2014, 
providing children or their representatives with the opportunity to access justice at the 
international level, but children are only able to use this complaints procedure if their State 
has ratified this Optional Protocol, and to date most countries, including the UK, have notii  
 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
There are other relevant international obligations which apply to particular regions, one of 
the most relevant in this context being the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child. This charter is unusual in that it not only echoes the language of the CRC in establishing 
the “best interests” standard, and provides for children’s views to be heard but it addresses 
specifically children with incarcerated mothers. The Charter requires parties “to provide 
special treatment to expectant mothers and to mothers of infants and young children” when 
convicted of criminal offences, and to “ensure that a non-custodial sentence will always be 
first considered when sentencing such mothers.” This article requires parties also to establish 
and promote alternatives to institutional confinement, and prohibits the death penalty for 
mothers. Boudin (2011) criticises this focus on mothers as ‘troubling’ (p.86) but recognises 
that the reality of child–rearing means that the responsibility for child-rearing usually falls on 
mothers. This approach is unsurprising, but does not recognise the role of fathers in child 
development and childcare, and, again unsurprisingly, does not recognise the nuances of 
parenting in LGBTQI+ contexts, or contexts around assisted reproduction where a binary 
categorisation of a parent as simply ‘mother’ or ‘father’ is inadequate.  
 
The European Convention on Human Rights 
In Europe prisoners’ rights litigation under the ECHR has a long history (van Zyl Smit & 
Snacken,  2009). In the UK, rights claims by prisoners under the ECHR has been enabled most 
recently by the access to justice prompted by the Human Rights Act 1998, which made the 
ECHR actionable in the domestic courts. It could be argued that in the UK the CRC has been 
less significant as a route for maintaining the rights of children of prisoners than the ECHR, 
most obviously because, unlike the ECHR, there is no direct enforcement mechanism.  Article 
8 establishes a qualified right to private and family life, which allows for proportionate 
interference with the rights of private and family life on the basis of interests such as public 
health and morality, and Lyon (2007) argued that public bodies and organisations should 
focus on remedies being brought under the HRA and the ECHR rather than attempting to do 
so with reference to the UNCRC. The European Court of Human Rights has stated that this 
balancing of competing interests needs to include the best interests of the child (Johansen v 
Norway [1996] ECHR 31). The qualified nature of the rights under Article 8 means that public 
safety and protection, including security, can be utilised as justifications for interference with 
rights, which can have a direct impact on prisoners’ children. This approach can be seen, for 
example, where security is used to justify restricting parent-child contact to ‘closed’ visits, 
even where this can cause distress and upset to the child who is unable to connect with their 
parent other than through glass (Codd, 2008). 
At the time of writing, the UK government has committed to repealing the HRA and instead 
replacing these rights with a UK-specific Bill of Rights. This would not remove the relevance 
of the ECHR treaty obligations, but challenges could not be brought in the domestic courts. 
Litigation to date has explored issues including the rights of mothers of young children in 
relation to Mother and Baby units; rights to parental leave and costs of phone calls , but these 
actions have not been brought by or on  on behalf of children themselves, even though they 
are equally protected as bearers of their own enforceable rights (Epstein 2014). Historically, 
rights-based litigation has focused on the rights of prisoners, rather than their children, and 
this is partly because of a core problem within the current structure of rights-based 
approaches which is dependent on actions being brought as a consequence of imfringement 
of rights, and also is a consequence of the UNCRC lacking an enforcement mechanism, unlike 
the ECHR. 
 
2. Domestic Constitutional Principles and Legislation as Sources of Rights for Children 
of Incarcerated Parents 
In some jurisdictions the rights of children with incarcerated parents are protected under the 
existing domestic constitution, or there is the potential to interpret constitutional provisions 
so as to promote and protect the wellbeing of prisoners children. Chesa Boudin (2011), 
himself the child of an imprisoned mother, reframes third party harms to children of prisoners 
and prison visitation policy in the US  through the lens of children’s rights rather than 
prisoners’ rights, grounding this within children’s constitutional rights of freedom of 
association under the First Amendment and due process liberty interests. Similarly, Kanaboshi 
et.al.  (2017) have argued that babies’ and toddlers’ rights to develop secure attachment 
relationships with their mothers are protected under several amendments to the US 
Constitution.  Boudin refers to the CRC, and UK case law, along with the S v M case in South 
Africa and also the proposed Bill of Rights for Children of Incarcerated Parents propounded 
by the  San Francisco Partnership for Incarcerated Parents (2003), arguing that many of these 
principles may have a legal basis in the existing US constitution. He also highlights good 
practice by individual state legislatures such as the state of New Jersey, which has passed 
several bills that together seek to reduce recidivism rates; protect children of prisoners and 
break the cycles of recidivism and intergenerational incarceration.  
South Africa’s Bill of Rights has been recognised internationally as a good example of 
constitutional provisions which protect and provide for the advancement of children’s rights 
(Alston & Tobin, 2005). A number of cases have been brought by children themselves and by 
organisations advocating for children’s rights, as the Constitution takes a broad approach to 
interpreting whom is defined as having sufficient standing to bring cases (Skelton, 2015). In 
addition, where a genuine constitutional issue is at stake a litigant is not at risk of having a 
costs order made against them if their action is unsuccessful, and if successful they are 
entitled to be awarded costs. This approach is thus significant in promoting genuine 
challenges by and on behalf of children. Cases brought before the South African 
 Constitutional Court have addressed a wide range of children’s issues, including rights to 
education and sentencing decisions for young offenders. The Constitutional Court has often 
interpreted the rights under the constitution with reference to the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) and the CRC, along with consideration of UN general 
comments, which, in the words of Skelton (2015) “gives South African child rights litigators a 
rich store-cupboard on which to draw.”  
 
There are some valuable examples of good practice in recognising the rights of prisoners’ 
children in national law, especially in Scandinavia. In Norway, the prison law has established 
children’s right to contact with their parents as a general principle, although children are 
never allowed to live with an imprisoned parent (Scharff Smith 2015). In Denmark, which 
shares a similar Scandinavian penological foundation, the prison law stipulates that children 
are only allowed to live in the prison with their parents if the conditions in the institution are 
suitable for children. In the UK, Wales has led the way in promoting the application of the 
principles of the CRC by passing the Rights of Children and Young People (Wales) Measure 
2011 with cross-party unanimous support, which created a duty on Welsh Ministers to have 
regard to the CRC, the first legislature within the UK to do so. It remains to be seen, however, 
how much impact this Measure has in relation to children of incarcerated parents, although 
family-focused work at HMP Parc has been applauded as a beacon of good practice in helping 
maintain positive relationships between children and their imprisoned fathers, including a 
designated family interventions unit wing, and Parc Supporting Families (PSF) offering 
multiple interventions including parent-teacher evenings and parenting courses (Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons, 2016). 
 
III Recognising Children’s Rights  
Although the rights of the children of incarcerated parents are relevant throughout the 
parent’s journey through the criminal justice system, much of the research literature has 
discussed and analysed rights issues at either the point of sentence, or in relation to the 
question of whether children should live with their parent(s) in prison. 
 
1. Recognising the Rights of Children when Sentencing a Parent 
Debates around children’s rights and parental imprisonment raise inevitable questions about 
whether courts should take into account the impact of imprisonment on the children of 
offenders at the point when they are being sentenced. Children are not by themselves parties 
to the criminal trial, as the trial itself engages in a binary manner with the offender and the 
state (Conway, 2010) and thus there is a significant question as to their status as third party 
actors and also, on a practical level, questions of appropriate mechanisms by which their 
interests could be articulated for consideration by the court (Donson & Parkes, 2016). Where 
children are the victims of the offence, then depending on the jurisdiction their experiences 
and views can be introduced by means of a Victim Impact Statement. Where they are not the 
victim, then the amount of weight consideration of the impact on children of sentencing a 
parent to imprisonment varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (Minson, S. Nadin, R. & Earle, 
J. 2015: Millar, H & Dandurand, Y. 2017). 
 
Evidence from the UK demonstrates that when deciding on a sentencing disposal, courts may 
regard responsibility for children as linked to the offender, for consideration as a form of 
mitigation (Donson &  Parkes, 2016). However, this form of personal mitigation is 
discretionary and is not rooted in consideration of the rights of children themselves: the focus 
is on the offender, and not on the interests of any children who might be affected by the 
sentence.  Where this information is provided to the court, as mitigation, it may be presented 
by the solicitor or barrister for the defence, in mitigation, or as part of a pre-sentence report 
(in England & Wales). In contrast with family cases involving children, in which a particular 
guardian is appointed to represent the interests of the child, there is no equivalent role in 
criminal trials in England & Wales.  
 
One might expect that the significant case of R v Rosie Petherick [2012] EWCA Crim 2214 
would have had an impact on the sentencing of mothers with dependent children in England 
and Wales. This Court of Appeal case built on previous cases in order to set out the approach 
to be taken by the court in balancing the sentencing process with the requirements under 
Article 8 of the ECHR. In this judgment the court recognised the interference posed by a prison 
sentence not only on the defendant but on other people including children. The court must 
therefore consider whether  
 
i) there was any interference with family life in accordance with Article 8;  
ii) that interference is in accordance with the law and in pursuit of a legitimate aim and  
iii) that this interference is proportionate, considering the balance between legitimate 
sentencing objectives on one hand and the Article 8 rights of dependent children on the other. 
The case made clear that the impact on children may make an apparently proportionate 
sentence disproportionate, and also clarified the place of the impact on children of claims 
concerning the right to life and mitigation, pointing out that where custody cannot 
proportionately be avoided, the impact on children may mitigate the length of sentence, but 
it also may not do so. 
 
On paper, Petherick seems to provide a firm statement recognising the importance of 
considering the impact of imprisonment on family members including children. However, it 
has not led to a change in the mindset of sentencers. Epstein (2014) found, for example, that 
sentencers routinely failed to conduct this ‘balancing act’ and the impact on children is taken 
as part of a traditional mitigatory approach and not with reference to children’s rights. This 
has been explained as being due to sentencers lacking information on which they could base 
this balancing act; lack of familiarity in lower courts with decisions of higher courts; concern 
aboiut perceived gender discrimination in favour of mothers and a concern that allowing 
recognition of children during the sentencing process could be seen as providing offenders 
with a ‘get out of jail free’ card (Minson, Nadin & Earle,  2015). 
   
One of the most significant judgements in relation to the rights of a child when a parent is 
being sentenced  is the 2007 judgment of Albie Sachs in the case of M versus The State ([2007] 
ZACC 18), a case brought in South Africa which has become the subject of a great deal of 
international attention and which has been applauded for demonstrating how children’s 
rights can be recognised and prioritised when deciding how to sentence a parent who is 
responsible for the care of dependent minor children.  
The case, heard before the Constitutional Court of South Africa, assessed whether, when 
considering whether to impose imprisonment on the primary caregiver of young children, the 
lower courts paid sufficient attention to the constitutional provision that in all matters 
concerning children, the children’s interests shall be paramount, as is enshrined in Section 28 
of the South African Constitution, which provides that:“[a] child’s best interests are of 
paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.” 
In this case, M was a 36 year old single mother of three boys aged 16, 12 and 8, and who had 
been sentenced to imprisonment for fraud. The core issue at stake was the nature of the 
duties of the sentencing court in the light of section 28(2) of the Constitution, and any relevant 
statutory provisions, when the person being sentenced is the primary caregiver of minor 
children; whether these duties were observed in this case; and, if these duties were not 
observed, what order should the Court make, if any. It was contended by the applicant, the 
curator ad litem and the amicus curiae (from the Centre for Child Law of the University of 
Pretoria) that the effect of section 28 of the Constitution was to require sentencing courts, as 
a matter of general practice, to give specific and independent consideration to the impact 
that a custodial sentence in respect of a primary caregiver could have on minor children. They 
argued on the facts that due consideration of the interests of M’s children required that an 
appropriately stringent correctional supervision order should be imposed in place of a 
custodial sentence. In response the National Director of Public Prosecution argued that 
current sentencing procedures in the courts already took account of the interests of children 
and that on the facts of the case the decision of the High Court should not be interfered with, 
a similar position being adopted by Counsel for the Department of Social Development and 
the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.  
 
In his judgment Albie Sachs began by explaining the basis of sentencing decisions in South 
Africa, this framework predating democracy. This process, formulated in the case of S v Zinn 
1969 (2) SA 537 (A) and often referred to as ‘the Zinn triad’ set out that “What has to be 
considered is the triad consisting of the crime, the offender and the interests of society”.  
Alongside this, in the P case (see Director of Public Prosecutions, KwaZulu-Natal v P (2006) 3 
SA 515 (SCA) it was said that in the assessment of an appropriate sentence the court is 
required to have regard to the main purposes of punishment, namely its deterrent, 
preventive, reformative and retributive aspects, to which mercy, as distinct from mere 
sympathy, has to be added. Sachs also added that it was necessary to take account of the fact 
that the traditional aims of punishment had been transformed by the Constitution, and 
stressed the importance of courts paying due respect to children’s rights, emphasising 
individual children as rights bearers:  
 
“Every child has his or her own dignity. If a child is to be constitutionally imagined as an 
individual with a distinctive personality, and not merely as a miniature adult waiting to reach 
full size, he or she cannot be treated as a mere extension of his or her parents, umbilically 
destined to sink or swim with them. The unusually comprehensive and emancipatory character 
of section 28 presupposes that in our new dispensation the sins and traumas of fathers and 
mothers should not be visited on their children.” (p.11) 
 
In addition, he recognised that the paramountcy principle entails state actions not harming 
children further: 
 
“No constitutional injunctions can and of itself isolate children from the shocks and perils of 
harsh family and neighbourhood environments. What the law can do is protect children from 
abuse and maximise opportunities for them to lead productive and happy lives. Thus, even if 
the state cannot itself repair disrupted family life, it can create positive conditions for repair 
to take place, and diligently seek where possible to avoid conduct of its agencies which may 
have the effect of placing children in peril. It follows that section 28 requires the law to make 
best efforts to avoid, where possible, any breakdown of family life or parental care that may 
threaten to put children at increased risk. Similarly, in situations where rupture of the family 
becomes inevitable, the State is obliged to minimise the consequent negative effect on 
children as far as it can.” 
 
In a previous case [Minister of Welfare and Population Development v. Fitzpatrick and Others 
2000 (3) SA 422] this was spoken of as a right, not just a guiding principle, which Sachs 
stressed. He then discussed the appropriate approach to sentencing where the person 
convicted was the primary caregiver of minor children, noting that that what is important is 
the concept of primary caregivers, not that of breadwinners. Essentially, it is a question of 
caring responsibilities and activities, not money. Although Counsel for the State argued that 
sentencing courts already considered the circumstances of the criminal, the amicus curiae 
responded that “a child of a primary caregiver is not a “circumstance”  but an individual whose 
interests need to be considered independently” (p.18). 
Sachs went on to address arguments that parents may escape punishment, but points out 
that it is the imposition of the sentence without special regard for  the children’s interests 
which threatened to harm them. 
Sachs then set out guidelines: 
a) A sentencing court should find out whether a convicted person is a primary caregiver 
whenever there are indications that this might be so. 
b) A probation officer’s report is not necessary to determine this in each case 
c) If on the Zinn triad approach the appropriate sentence is clearly custodial and the convicted 
person is a primary caregiver, the court must apply its mind to whether it is necessary to take 
steps to ensure that the children will be adequately cared for while the caregiver is 
incarcerated. 
d) If the appropriate sentence is clearly non-custodial, the court must determine the appropriate 
sentence, bearing in mind the interests of the children. 
e) Finally, if there is a range of appropriate sentences on the Zinn approach the court must use 
the paramountcy principle concerning the interests of the child as an important guide in 
deciding which sentence to impose. 
 
He noted that a balancing exercise has to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis, balancing 
the importance of maintaining the integrity of family care with the duty on the State to punish 
criminal misconduct. 
 
“The paramountcy principle, read with the right to family care, requires that the interests of 
children who stand to be affected receive due consideration. It does not necessitate overriding 
all other considerations. Rather, it calls for appropriate weight to be given in each case to a 
consideration to which the law attached the highest value, namely the interests of children 
who may be concerned.” (p.26) 
 
Sachs pointed out that the question put to M by the Regional Magistrate and the prosecution 
at her trial, that of whether if she went to prison her children would be on the street, was 
inadequate and that this meant that sentence was passed without sufficient independent and 
informed attention as required by section 28. The Constitutional Court decided that it could 
reconsider the sentence. In doing this the court had to balance the fact that she had 
defrauded members of the community three times and over a period of years and had 
offended while serving a suspended sentence and later on bail, with the fact that she had 
spent seven years developing a lawful and legitimate community business and she was a good 
parent in relation to her children. She had also offered to pay back the amount defrauded in 
monthly instalments. 
The court concluded that as the offences were deliberate and involving deception, the 
sentence of four years’ imprisonment should stand. She had already spent three months in 
prison, one awaiting trial and two after the sentence was imposed. Sachs concluded that the 
sentence already served should be backdated and the rest should be suspended so she need 
not go back to prison, and a correctional supervision order should be added on. He explained 
that he was influenced by the reports which indicated that it was clearly in the interests of 
the children if they continued to receive primary care from their mother:  
 
“despite the bad example M has set, she is in a better position than anyone else to see to it 
that the children continue with their schooling and resist the pressures and temptations that 
would be intensified by the deprivation of her care in a socially fragile environment” (p.44).  
 
It is important to realise that the impact on the children was not decisive on its own; rather, 
in conjunction with her offer to repay the persons defrauded, the fact that she had behaved 
lawfully for seven years, and the fact that she had “manifested a will to conduct herself 
correctly.” She thus, in conjunction with the suspended sentence, was ordered to be under 
correctional supervision for three years, performing ten hours per week of service of benefit 
to the community, also undergoing counselling as appropriate and repaying to those 
defrauded an amount equal to the value of the goods obtained. Six judges agreed with Sachs 
and three judges dissented.  
The case is significant as it demonstrates a ‘changed mind-set’ in sentencing caregivers, and 
allowing the rights of children affected by sentencing decisions to be introduced into the 
decision-making process (Donson & Parkes, 2016). The principles set out in S v M were 
followed by the same court subsequently in S (2011 (7) BCLR 740 (CC)  where the court held 
that a co-parent was available to care for the children, although the dissenting judgment of 
Khampepe J in this case is significant, in that she argued that insufficient consideration had 
been given to the quality of alternative care which could be provided by the husband and that 
justice could be served just as effectively by ordering correctional supervision with 
appropriate conditions attached: as Skelton (2011) has argued, “if the possible imprisonment 
will be detrimental to the child, then the scales must tip in favour of a non-custodial sentence, 
unless the case is so serious that it would be entirely inappropriate”. Reported cases since the 
decision in S v M have indicated that there has been some progress in altering the mindset of 
sentencing courts in South Africa, Carnelley & Epstein, (2012)highlighting that in the lower 
courts these guidelines have been followed consistently prior to sentencing- while it has not 
always meant that non-custodial sentences have been handed down, the courts have become 
‘sensitised’ to the needs of children when sentencing the primary caregiver. This case has 
prompted discussion and debate around law, policy and practice in several countries outside 
South Africa, as seen in Scotland where Albie Sachs himself delivered several influential 
presentations and prompted discussion by the Scottish Sentencing Council and invited expert 
participants (Scottish Sentencing Council 2017). 
 
2. The Rights of Children Inside and Outside the Prison 
One of the thorniest dilemmas concerning the rights of children whose parents are 
incarcerated relates to babies and children who are either born while the mother is in prison, 
or who accompany their mother into the prison while the sentence is served. Much of the 
published research literature focuses on mothers and children who are separated by reason 
of a prison sentence, especially that from the US, Europe and Australia & New Zealand 
(Scharff-Smith & Gampell (eds.) 2011: Celinska & Siegel , 2010: Bernstein 2005). In contrast, 
however, in many countries in the word babies and children live with their mothers in prison, 
with wide variation in their experiences. Just as the dominant view in the literature from the 
‘West’ is of mothers mothering from the inside, the dominant view in the rest of the world is 
of mothers mothering on the inside.  This dominant focus on mothers, rather than fathers or 
other caregivers,  has been criticised but most specific residential facilities in prisons are 
aimed at mothers, with an exception being the the family units in Aranjuez Prison, Spain, 
where imprisoned mothers and fathers can live together with their children aged up to three 
years’ old (Paurus, 2017). 
The CRC has paid particular attention to the challenges of identifying the best interests of 
children in this context, the core question being whether the best interests of the child are 
best served by either allowing the child to live with their mother in the prison, or whether the 
child’s best interests are served by separating the mother from the child, the child living with 
other family, kin or friends, or within the state care system. In the US, this focus on long-term 
stability for children led to the controversial provisions of the Adoption and Safe Families Act 
1997, which, by stressing ‘permanency planning’, led to many imprisoned parents 
experiencing the termination of their parental rights entirely, their children being freed for 
adoption. The UN has emphasised that the birth of babies in prison, or by prisoners, should 
be avoided throught the use of non-custodial alternatives to incarceration for pregnant 
women, and that similarly non-custodial penalties should be used where possible in order to 
prevent separation of mothers and children. The benefits for babies and children are that a 
baby can continue to be breastfed, bond with the mother and develop a strong attachment 
relationship. The disadvantages include the physical and environmental inadequacy and 
limitations of the prison setting; potential dangers posed by other inmates, and 
institutionalisation. That said, there are many examples of prison nurseries, mother and baby 
units, and half-way houses, in which babies and children can spend varying amounts of time 
with their mothers, and examples of child-focused visitation and contact arrangements which 
mean that although the child lives outside the prison they are able to develop and maintain  
strong relationships with their imprisoned parent (Codd, 2013: Paurus, 2017). 
Many of the arguments in favour of facilitating children to live in prison with their mothers 
draw on psychological theories of bonding and attachment. However, in many parts of the 
world the social and economic situation of the mother, combined with a lack of state childcare 
and child protection provision, may mean that if the child is not allowed to remain with the 
mother then the child may be at risk not just of psychological harm but also starvation; 
neglect; abuse; exploitation and death (The Law Library of Congress Global Legal Research 
Centre 2014: Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza 1999: Henry-Lee 2005: Bharucha 2007). Babies and 
children may share the same beds as their mothers, share their food, and not have access to 
healthcare or education, but in the simplest terms it is still better for them to stay with their 
mother than to be separated. In countries which have considered this issue in children’s rights 
terms, this is not an easy decision, and when the child is sufficiently able to form a view, that 
view must be heard, under the CRC. Increasingly, research has emerged which compares 
policies and provisions from different jurisdictions, a common complaint being that children 
living in prison with a parent are too often ignored,  leading to their needs and best interests 
being unrecognised and unmet (Enroos, 2015: Robertson, 2008: Alejos 2005: Rosenberg 
2009). This research demonstrates that children’s rights are often not considered, and that 
even when the best interests test is recognised it is difficult to determine what is in a child’s 
best interests in a particular context or culture (James & James, 2004).   
 
IV: Conclusion 
The rights of prisoners’ children in many countries are, arguably, unenforceable and thus 
illusory without specific legislation enshrining CRC rights within domestic law, and without a 
written constitution, bill of rights and supporting case law, as exemplified  in South Africa.  
There is a strong case for arguing that rights-based approaches are inadequate and flawed in 
this context, as it could be argued that although children’s rights appear to be guaranteed in 
a range of treaties, rights discourse has ultimately failed to promote and protect children’s 
well-being, as Posner (Posner 2014) has highlighted in the context of international human 
rights law as a whole. That said, as Fortin (2014) points out, there has been a serious 
commitment in the UK, led by Baroness Hale, that all public agencies must consider children’s 
best interests as a primary consideration when they reach decisions which affect children, 
either directly or indirectly. This has meant, for example, that the immigration law decision in 
ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4 was referred to in 
the case of R (MP) v Secretary of State for Justice [2012] EWHC 214 (Admin), in which it was 
held that the prison authorities were obliged to interpret Article 3 of the CRC in relation to 
the availability of Childcare Resettlement Leave in the light of that provision, even if it was 
not enshrined in primary legislation.  
The M case, and subsequent cases in South Africa, could be held to be of limited relevance to 
other jurisdictions, as the South African Constitution itself provides a very strong statement 
as to the paramountcy of children’s rights, reflecting the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child. . In addition, the M case engaged highly qualified and senior members 
of the judiciary, including Albie Sachs, in explaining the nature, grounds and justifications for 
rethinking the sentencing decision-making process when sentencing parents with dependent 
children. This case illustrates well, however, the potential for judicial leadership so as to make 
children’s rights a paramount consideration. 
Provision for, and consideration of, the needs of children of incarcerated parents has been 
more often interpreted as a function of social work, or as a means of maintaining family 
relationships in order to promote desistance than as a significant question of children’s rights. 
However, there are some inspiring examples of child-focused practice. In Sweden, Denmark 
and Norway, Children’s Officers have been created. These are prison staff, who are 
responsible for ‘anchoring’ a children’s rights perspective in their institution with regard to 
prisoners’ children (Scharff Smith 2015), this role including issues of visits and child-centred 
events. That said, in his account of the situation in Scandinavian penal cultures, Scharff Smith 
asserts that there is still a long way to go towards making sure that children’s rights are always 
taken into account, and he calls for concrete national standards with regard to issues such as 
child-friendly visiting conditions and practices. He stresses the importance of making sure that 
children’s rights, when applied to prisoners’ children, are not just abstract principles but 
“actual legal rights with practical implications” (p.168). In 2014 in Italy, a Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed which brought together the main Italian NGO working with 
children of prisoners (Bambinisenzasbarre); the Minister for Justice and the National 
Ombudsman for Childhood and Adolescence. This MOU related to the fulfilment and 
protection of the rights of children of imprisoned parents, and this was renewed in 2016. 
Article 1 of the Memorandum covers judicial decisions, where judicial authorities are 
encouraged to take into account the rights and needs of any underage children of an arrested 
or detained person who still has parental responsibility; giving priority to alternative 
measures to pre-trial detention. Authorities are required to provide contact between a pre-
trial detainee and their child in respect of the child’s rights. In addition the Memorandum 
includes the recommendations made by the Children of Prisoners Europe (COPE)  network 
with regards to visiting conditions and provisions for children of imprisoned parents, and also 
the location of the prison in order to guarantee direct contact between children and their 
parents. This Memorandum signals a joint, combined commitment to the rights of prisoners’ 
children, informed by research. 
If we look at situations when prisoners' children interact with the family justice system then 
we see situations where they are recognised as vulnerable and where their interests are 
recognised and prioritised, as in decision-making after parental relationship breakdown or 
during local authority care proceedings. Interestingly, in  residence and contact cases 
following parental relationship breakdown they are not the primary parties involved in the 
case, as the primary parties are the separating or divorcing parents. However, their needs and 
benefit are of fundamental importance. In contrast, when parental sentencing decisions are 
concerned they are not accorded the same importance or standing. A number of arguments 
have been put forward in relation to mechanisms for challenging the binary focus of the 
adversarial criminal trial, as exists in countries including the UK, Ireland and the US. Courts in 
many jurisdictions already receive additional information in the form of  specialist reports, 
such as in Pre-Sentence Reports in England & Wales, and a number of commentators have 
argued for Child Impact Statements to become a compulsory requirement in cases where the 
offender is responsible for children. However, although this would seem to offer a potential 
for including and recognising the impact on children, the simple presentation of a report is 
not sufficient to guarantee a particular outcome, especially if the application of the 
information in the report is interpreted as discretionary rather than mandatory.  
 
To conclude, the provisions under the UNCRC are wide enough in scope to include the 
children of prisoners. However, the Convention lacks integral mechanisms for translating 
paper rights into practice, so the rights remain aspirational and are only concrete and actual 
if a state makes that happen. The existence of a legal right is, of course, no guarantee that 
those rights will translate into actual policies, or be enforceable at the grassroots level. It has 
been argued, for example that concepts of children’s rights do not lead automatically to 
better outcomes for children, and that a ‘best interests’ or approaches based on duties may 
be more valuable (Ferguson, 2013). The ‘paper tiger’ of the CRC itself means that these rights, 
while existing on paper, may become ‘theoretical and illusory’ in real life, and as Jane Fortin 
has argued eloquently “it takes a very unusual child to come forward and make claims of this 
kind” (p.53). This issue is of course not new, nor restricted to children: in many penal systems 
rights which exist on paper are unenforceable in practice, as demonstrated by research in 
India by Kaushik and others (Kaushik & Sharma, 2009: Kaushik, 2010) where legislative 
protections of women prisoners’ rights were of no practical value because women were 
unable to challenge agencies in authority, due to fear of the prison guards and poor literacy. 
The other issue is that of vulnerability: the apparent burden of rights claims falls on those who 
are victimised and vulnerable, although this situation could be improved if all decisions of 
public bodies have to comply with the provisions of the CRC or similar from the outset, pre-
empting complaints after the event. Children need access to justice, including information on 
potential remedies, and should be supported or assisted in accessing justice mechanisms, 
which are tailored to the needs of individual children and, for young children, could include 
the appointment of a guardian ad litem or similar person responsible for ensuring their views 
are heard by the court (Liefaard 2015). There is no doubt that the children of imprisoned 
parents posses legal rights: the challenge is to ensure that these rights translate into real-life 
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i QUNO has also compiled a database of relevant recommendations from the CRC  in relation to children of 
imprisoned parents – see www.crccip.com  
ii For information on which countries have ratified this Protocol see http://ratifyop3crc.org/  
                                                            
